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Considerations for the Baltics, East Central Europe,
and members of the Commonwealth of Independent States
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AUTHOR'S PREFACE
To state the obvious, the former constituent republics of the Soviet Union· and the once
Communist-ruled Eastern European states face numerous difficulties. The questions of how to
maintain national independence, ensure survival in a dangerous.world, and protect the
continuing creation of new democratic and just systems are of primary concern.
The issue of providing· effecti~e,national defense under,difficult conditions needs to
.take into. consideration: '(l) the dangers of war and internal violence, '(2)"the risk of losing selfreliance by placing on.e's defense in 'the hands of foreign states,. an_d (3) the high ecqnomic cost
of :military weaponry that ~ould aggravate already serious economic problems.
This paper.a~dresses a defense policy which can potentially avoid those three dangers ·
while greatly increasing the actual defense capacity of these countries. This policy is civilian- I

"

•

F

•

'

based defense. It is a policy which relies on the determination of the population. ·and the
stringth .of the society- to make it impossible for foreign aggressors or internal putschists to
ruie.
Civilian-based defense appli~s prepared noncooperation and political defiance by
trained_populations. This would operate by preventing the attackers from ruling the attacked
I

•

~

•

sobiety, _denying them their other objectives, subverting their troops- and functionaries,· and
-

l

.

-

.

mobilizing inten{ationai opposition to th~ attack. All this is done in ways which are most
I

I

i

i

!

I

·

·

'

'

difficult
for the attackers
to counter.
i
I
.

,' This pap~r relates this policy to the countries of the· Baltics, East Central. Europe, and
:

i'

'

'

'

the Commonwdlth
of Independent States 1 all of which must
assess what their future defense
' '
t
'
I
I

l
I

.

.

-

•

.

1 "East Gentral Europe" is used here primarily to indicate the form~rly Communist fll:led · _
countries of Pol~d, Czechoslovakia, Hungary~ Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, anq Yugoslavia
(a.Q.d its successor-states such as Slovenia and Croatia). The.analysis-which refers to the ·
members of the icommonwealth of Independent States is also relevant -to Georgia. and to
nations now asserting· claims of independence which were formerly part of the Soviet Uniorr or
its republics. I
·
.
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policies will be, now that independence has come and the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.
are gone.
This type of defense has its roots in several improvised defense struggles in Europe, as
well as in much of the resistance and liberation struggles waged in Communist-ruled nations
during the decades of totalitarian domination. However, in civilian-based defense this
resistance is Utilized .in refined and strengthened forms.
Persons, groups, and governments that are interested in the discussion of civilian-based
'

defense in this paper are strongly encouraged to turn for further· study to my more detailed
book Civilian-Based Defense.(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990), and
to the Lithuanian, Latvian, Estonian, Polish, and Russian editipns which are now in
preparation. Pu~lication details of these and other translations can be obtained by writing to
Gene Sharp, Albert Einstein Institution, 1430 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge,
Massachusetts 02138, USA.
)

0 Copyright 1992 by Gene Sharp. This manuscript is not to be published in any form
without the written permission of the author.. Inquiries are, however, welcome, and should be
addressed to: Gene Sharp, D. Phil. (Oxon.), Senior Scholar-in-Residence, Albert Einstein
Institution, 1430 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge,· Massachusetts 02138, USA.- 10,
February 1992.
'
I am grateful to Bruce Jenkins for valuable assistance in the preparation of tqis p~per; to Roger
Powers for helpful editorial suggestions, and to Stephen Coady for proofreading. Dr.
Christopher Keuegler offered important substantive recommendations. I also thank Professor
Robin Remington for her helpful criticisms and suggestions of an earlier draft.

I

}
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-Part One

CAN THERE BE ~OTIIER TYPE OF DEFENSE?
The need for effective defense
Many events of the twentieth century have demonstrated that we live irt a dangerous
world. From these experiences several facts are clear. The international security situation can
change rapidly. External dangers may arise unexpectedly and from unanticipated sources.
Small nonprnvocative nations and newly independent countries are sometimes victims of
aggression. Not even large countries with developed military capacities are immune from
foreign attack. In addition, internal attacks, as by coups d'etat, occur widely. Political,
military, or economic cliques at times attempt to impose dictatorships on their own people.
However·such dangers may temporarily recede or grow, external and internal threats will not
disappear permanently.
The conclusion is inescapal,)le: th~re is a need for defense. However, it is far from
obvious how to provicfe effective defense; that is protection·and preservation of a nation's
society and independence in face of an attack.
At this time, the problems of reliability and effectiveness .in .defense are particularly
acute for the formerly Communist states of East Ce~tral Europe, ranging from Poland to
Bulgaria, and for the former constituent republics of the Soviet Union, from Lithuania to
Uzbekistan.
These countries are now 'freed from their Communist governments (although not always

.

from elite rule). Their independence has been recognized internationally.
The .Warsaw Pact
.
and even the Soviet Union are gone. Yet, along with many other difficulties, these countries
face, and will continue to face, defense problems. The international situation remains fluid.
These nations may still at some point face a powerful expansionist neighbor, foreign military
interference in certain border areas, or very likely internal attempts to impose new
,·

dictatorships. Serious internal social, ~onomic, and political problems--including ethnic artd
national conflicts--could contribute to wider interpational or internal conflicts.
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Yet, 'the traditional conception of defense--military defense--is bereft with problems, as
we shall explore. All the countries of the. Bal.tics, East Central Europe, and the former Soviet
empire now have direct interests in maintaining their new independence without becoming
highly dependent on a powerful ally or alliance. Therefore, if an alternative to militarization
and dependence is at all° possible, it may help these nations secure their independence and
.internal freedom without inviting potential disaster.

If military means are employed for defense or to deal with internal ethnic, ·national,
political, or economic problems, the forces of centralization and dictatorship would very likely
be strengthened. Fear of "civil war" could give those forces greater support: The plight of
Croatia in late 1991--relying on military defence--should serve as a strong warning to Qthers.

Ways not to meet defense needs

Recognition of the need for external and internal defense in no way ensures that
'

.

effective means of defense are obvious or,. if available, will be selected. Some defense efforts
may even produce disaster.
Self-reliant military defense. The most common response to foreign aggression has

been military resistance. However, military resistance is not necessarily the most suitable and
effective defense policy. This is particularly true for the countries of the Bal.tics, East Central
Europe, and the Commonwealth of Independent States.
The cost of modem military technology virtually precludes small and poor c~untries
from acquiring military self-defense-capacities sufficient. to repel militarily powerful attackers.
Modern military equipment and weapons--even tanks and airplanes--are now extremely
expensive, and the costs are d1sproportionately high for these countries. If they purchase
these, serious economic problems are likely to be aggravated. If they receive these as gifts
from a larger state, these countries risk falling under the donor's hegemony. Even for richer
countries, the costs of "modernizing" professional military systems, are very high. That fact,
combined with grave economic problems, argues strongly against quixotic attempts by these
'

.
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nations to acquire modern military weapons. Attempts to prepare strong self-reliant military .
defense can also contribute to economic disaster.
However, even if the problem of financial cost could be solved, the fact remains that
military means do not necessarily produce defense.· It is virtually impossible to protect one's
society against the extraordinary destructive power and range of modef11 military weapons.
Defense in the sense of protection and preservation is quite different from war.
When military weapons are actually used in war, grave problems arise:
• the defending population potentially experiences great destruction and casualties; and
■ larger

military ·powers will most likely defeat smaller ones, and that at a terrible cost.

Moreover, military build-ups have other grave disadvantages. The escalation of war. fighting capacities is likely to aggravate existing tensions betw'een neighboring countries

-

(especially where there is a history of grievances or contested borders). National minorities,
possibly remembering past oppression, may, fear that the enlarged military apparatus will be
used against them. Increased military preparations may increase the likelihood that in
international crises the military option actually will be used, instead of possible alternatives.

Dangers of depending on others. Given these problems of self-reliant military defense,
small countries may ab~don efforts to go it •alone, and instead solicit the military assistance· or
guarantees of a major military power or alliance. Passing the problem and responsibility to
others can be tempting. However, this is not a satisfactory solution.
When ·defense depends. on foreign assistance, most judgments about whether to fight,
· when to do so, and for how long are in the hands of the assisting military "friend, 11 not the
attacked nation. In crises, militarily powerful allies may well prefer "order" to justice and
freedom, and are likely to place their own interests ab:ove the defense needs of the attacked
nation. More rudely stated, militarily powerful "allies" may stand aside when their help is
needed, may intervene only to"help themselves, or may even betray the.countries they are
supposed to assist. Cz~hs and Slovaks can testify to this: abandoned by their allies in 1938,
they ·were in turn invaded by their new allies thirty years later!
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If foreign military assistance does come, one's own country is likely to.become the
deadly battle ground. Such foreign assistance may be able to destroy but not really to defend ..
Furthermore, military involvement of another country or alliance risks expanding the conflict
into a wider international war.

Guerrilla war as a defense option? In light of the problems of conventional forms of
military defense some persons may suggest guerrilla war as an answer. Guerrilla warfare does
not usually require the extremely expensive military outlays of conventional war, and
guerrillas have some~imes defeated militarily stronger enemies. However, guerrilla warfare
does not provide a realistic defense option for the countries of the Baltics, East Central
Europe, and the former Soviet republics because it ~ould subject them to immense casualties
and destruction with little assurance of success. Guerrilla struggles--seen through political
filters--are at times emotionally appealing, and are often romanticized. However, as defense
policies, they suffer from many disadvantages.
In this type of warfare the casualty rates among the civilian population and guerrillas
are almost always exceptionally high, much greater than in conventional warfare. This was
illustrated by the partisan struggles against the Nazis in Yugoslavia. 2 ·
Guerrilla struggles are also likely to reinforce the loyalty of the attackers' troops. when
their own lives are at stake, at the very time when the resistance would benefit most from their
demoralization and disintegration as a fighting force. Also, guerrilla struggle may take many
years, may fail, and may result in vast social destruction. Even when successful, a guerrilla
struggle may be followed by a new dictatorship ruling over an exhausted populace, as occurred
in China, Algeria, and Vietnam. The vastly expanded military capacity produced by war can
later provide the strong arm of repression in the hands of the political elite that commands
those same military forces.
2 Yugoslavia: lost about 10.6 percent of its population during the war. These fatalities
included many interpartisan killings as well. Adam Roberts, Nations in Arms: The Theory
and Practice of Territorial Defence. Second edition (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986
[1976]), p. 140.
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"Defensive defense" as an option. This policy, which has_ several variants, is often also
called "nonoffensive defense" and "nonprovocative defense."~ The basic conception is to
configure military forces so that by their nature, mobility, and range they cannot be used for
military aggression or to attack distant targets. Instead of rockets, for example, short-range
fighter planes might be employ~, and instead of tanks, anti-tank weapons would be used.
This absence of effective military attack capacity would, it is argued, reduce anxieties and
expectations of attack in neighboring countries that wish only to be able to defend themselves,
and thereby reduce the risk of war~
The problems with a "defensive defense" policy become more obvious when an attack
is actually launched. The risk of military escalation by· either side with one's own or foreign
weapons of ·greater destructiv(}ness would remain. Even if escalation of weaponry does not
occur, defensive ~ar waged with this policy would almost guarantee immense civilian
casualties among the de~ending population. In practice, the policy is essentially a combination
of guerrilla warfare with high technology weaponry. The basic problems inherent in guerrilla
warfare therefore are present here.

The internal defense problem:
coups
d'etat
I
.

Foreign aggression is not the only defense problem these countries may face. There is
also the internal defense problem of coups d'etat (including _executive usurpations) and
declarations of martial law as means to establish dictatorships.
3 Literature about "defensive defense" includes the following: Jonathan Dean, "Alternative
Defence: Answer to NATO's Central Front Problems?" International Affairs, vol. 64, no. 1
(Winter 1987), pp. 61-88; Stephen J. Flanagan, "Nonprovocative and Civilian-Based
Defense," in Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Graham T.·Allisc>n, and Albert Carnesale, editors, Fateful
Visions (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1988),.pp. 93-109; Frank Barnaby and Egbert Boeket,
"Defence Without Offence" (Bradford,· England: University of Bradford, Peace Studies Paper
No ..8, 1982; Horst Afh~ldt, Defensive Verteidigung (Reinbek, Hamburg: Rowohlt
Taschenbuch Verlag, 1983); Anders Boserup, "Non-Offensive Defense in Research, Working
Paper No. 5, 1985); Norbert Hannig, "Verteidigung ohne zu Bedrohen," (Universitat ·
Stuttgart: Arbeitsgruppe Friedensforschung und Europaische Sicherheit, Paper No. 5, 1986);
Hans Heinrich Nolte and Wilhelm Nolte, Ziviler Widerstand und Autonome Abwehr (BadenBaden: Nomos Verlag, 1984); Lutz Unterseher, Defending Europe (Bonn: Studiengruppe
Alternative Sicherheitspolitik, 1986).
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In a time of widespread economic, social, and political dislocation in the countries of
the Baltics, East Central Europe, and the former Soviet Union, internal fnstabilities
are .
.
manifest. Through attempted coups d'etat or other means, former elites· may seek to subvert
or destroy democratic processes.· Former _Communist
hard.,,liners
calling for "law and order,"
I
•
or new political or military groups may seek to impose a dictatorial system. New forms of
fascism may arise as well, with chauvi_nistic appeals to restore national II greatness. 11
Intelligence agencies, foreign or domestic, may intervene.
A dangerous corollary to the development of a powerful military system, even if
intended only to provide defense against external attacks, is that it creates an internal danger.
Powerful military systems-may defy control by civil institutions, increasing the possibility of
successful coups d'etat.
Not all military establishpients are inclined to. carry out coups against legitimate
. governments. Officers may be genuinely committed to constitutional procedures. However,
as. the history of some countries in Easf Central Europe and the former Soviet Union
illustrates, coups d'etat can be a powerful threat to constitutional governments, and are a
common way ,in which new dictatorships are impqs~.
The specific forms and purposes of future coups d'etat and other usurpations are not all
knowable in advance, but the danger they pose is undeniable. Witness.the August 1991
attempted "gang of eight'' coup in the Soviet Union. Traditional military means of defense
provide no answer to these types of attack short of civil w:µ-, and that with little chance of
success unless the putschists are very weak. Even the suspension of the very freedoms one is .
.

.

seeking to defend, in efforts to control dangerous cliques; is not a reliable means of prevention

.

or defense against coups.
Internal usurpations and international aggression· possess both common and distinct
·characteristics. They may appear to be fundamentally different,. one usually an internal
matter, the o~her is clearly foreign. However, they do bear some similarities. Each is a
defense' problem .. Successful coups and successful invasions are both unconstitutional seizures
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l

of the state and society. Both lead to the imposition of illegitimate rule, and both may produce
grave oppression of the society as a whole. Internal dangers as well as external ones therefore
need to be kept in mind when planning defense policies .

. A substitute system of defense is needed
In summary, defense against attack, and sufficient strength to make attack less likely,
are still required by the Baltic countries, the nations of East Central Europe, and the members
of the Commonwealth of Independent States. At the same time, for various of these countries
self-reliant military defense has virtually no chance of being successful. Military assistance
from major foreign states or alliances with massive military resources is both problematic and
dangerous.
-

Recognition of problems with military defense policies shoµld not lead to the
.

.

conclusion that the answer lies in simple-rejection of military means .. A solution is not that
easy. When faced with attack, if people and nations are offered no options except submission
on the one hand and military resistance on the other,. they will choose war almost every time.
Calls for ,,·peace" in face of aggression will not be heeded when they are seen as capitulation,
passivity, and submission. Therefore, it is essential to examine critically alternative policies
for providing effective deterrence and defense.
Could there be an alternative qefense policy that does not suffer the flaws of military
means? Could there be a defense policy that refa~s on a different approach entirely, but yet is
rooted in historical experience and po~tical reality? Such a policy would need to be one
which:

I is effective in deterring and defending against att3:~ks, both e~ternal and internal;
■

is self-reliant,

I does not bankrupt the country,

a does not produce massive deaths and destruction, and
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a.:: does not place one's fate in the hands of powerful friends likely to serve their own

interests first.

New ways of thinkin&
'
.
'
The problem of how to provide effective self-defense without producing _either
/

economic bankruptcy or military .disaster has usually seemed to be without a solution. Perhaps
our inability to :find a.solution derives from barriers in our thinking. Perhaps there is no
fundamentally more adequate alternative unless we attempt to think outside of the military
framework. As Commander Sir Stephen King~Hall (later Lord King-Hall) once stated, we
need tff "break through the thought barrier. 114
To do this, we must first draw careful distinctions between the terms "defense"· and
"military" for they are not the same, and may indeed i~ many cases be incompati~le with one
another.
"Defen.se" is used here to mean the protection or preservation of a country's
independence, ·its right to choose its own way of life, institutions, and standards of legitimacy,
and to protect its own people's lives, freedom, and opportunities for future development.
"Defense" may also be defined as instrumentally effective action to defeild--that is, action
which preserves, wards off, protects, and minimizes harm in the face of hostile attack. ·
Military means have been long recognized as the predominant methods _used to provide
defense. However, in certain situations military means have been incapable of actually
defending, as distinct from attacking, retaliating, killing, or destroying~ Military capacity is
only one set of means that may be intended to achieve the objective of defense. Modern
military technology makes the relationship between military means and defense even more
tenuous. Modern weapons ar:e often too destructive actually to defend, and at times their very
4 Commander Sir Stephen King-Hall, "Common Sense in Defence" (pamphlet) (London: K-:H
. Services, 1960),- p. 23. Sir Stephen's use of the term referred to facing the tfl;lth that nuclear
war would be something "basically and absolutely different" from any previous war.
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presence may encourage attack. The stationing of nuclear weapons, for example, may not
only ensure that country will be targeted by other nuclear powers, but may even make it more
vulnerable to a preemptive attack.

Civilian-based defense

There now_ exists a possible alternative defense policy which aims to provide deterrence
and. defense .but by civilian means. It is called "civilian-based· defense."
Civilian-based defense is a policy intended to deter and defeat both foreign military
invasions and occupations as _well as internal take-overs, including executive usurpations and
coups d'etat. Civilian-based defense applies social, economic, political, and psychological
"weapons" (or specific methods of action) to wage widespread noncooperation and political
defiance.
·A civilian-~ased defense struggle would seek the following aims to:

I make the attacked society, its population and institutions, unrulable by aggressors;

. ,1 deny the attackers their objectives;

I

make impossible the consolidation of ~ffective government (whether a foreign

administration, a puppet regime, or a government of usurpers),

I

make the costs of attack and domination unacceptable; and,

• in some circumstances, destroy the attackers' military and· administrative forces by
subverting the loyalty and reliability of the attackers' troops and functionaries,
especially in carrying out orders for repression, and even to induce them to mutiny.
Among the questions that we need now to consider seriously are these:

I

Can nonviolent struggle--~so called "people power" --be transformed into a powerful

defense?

,m Can such nonviolent struggle significantly contribute to the total defense capacity of a
country or even. replace military means for defense?

15

I

Could that capacity, furthermore, be made strong enough,'so that it could deter, or at

least contribute to deterring, external aggression and internal usurpation.
There is strong evidence that we can begin to answer these questions in the affirmative.
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Part Two
ANOTHER HISTORY

Prototypes of a new defense policy

One indication that a civilian-based defense policy may be possible is that it has
· important precedents in improvised defense stniggles of the past. There exist prototypes of
defense against both international aggression and coups d'etat by the application of social,
political, economic, and psychological power.
Of course, the power of nonviolent struggle has been demonstrated in cases beyond
those primarily concerned with defense. In the search for effective means of self-reliant
defense for the countries of the Baltics, East Central Europe, and the former Soviet empire,
these non-defense cases of people power must also be considered. As most know, the history
of this type of struggle for liberation and defense in East Central Europe is not new. Since the
Second World War powerful nonv~olent struggles have occurred in East Germany (1953 and
1989), in Hungary (1956-1957 and 1988-1989), in Poland (1956, 1970-1971, and 1980-1989),
in Czechoslovakia (1968-1969 and 1989), and in the Baltic states (1987-1991).
In recent years, especially in late i989, the peoples of these regions exhibited stunning
power in dissolving well-entrenched dictatorships through largely nonviolent means. The
democratic revolutions of 1989 and 1990 s·elf-reliantly liberated several nations and millions of
people. This was done with far fewer casualties and much less destruction than would have
accompanied massive violent-uprisings or invasions by foreign liberating armies. These
· revolutions are of much greater historical importance- for the liberation and defense of peoples
and nations throughout the world than the 1991 Gulf War.
These revolutions cannot be explained away, as some have attempted, simply as the
consequence of decades of the United States or NATO military pressure, or by the fact that a

.

.

more sensible Mr. Gorbachev occupied the Kremlin rather than a reincarnation of Mr.
Brezhnev. Certainly many factors played roles in these revolutions. ~owever, one of the
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major factors was people power: large segments of the population engaged in massive
nonviolent struggle. In this technique of direct action, people and institutions protest
symbolically, noncooperatein social, economic, and political ways, and interven~
psychologically, politically, and physically in situations they oppose. Such methods can slow,
paralyze, disrupt, or destroy an opponents' system, as occurred in these cases.
The history of E~ropean nonviolent struggle, of course, goes back _much earlier than
the Second World War. The Hungarian nonviolent resistance against Austrian rule, especially
1850-1867, and Finland's disobedience and political noncooperation against" Russian rule,
- 1898-1905, are_ both examples of nonviolent struggle against long-established foreign
occ1:1pations. The Russian 1905 Revolution and the February 1917 revolution weakened and
then destroyed the Tsarist system. Both were predominantly nonviolent. '.fhe 1940-1945 antiNazi resist\Ilce in Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, and elsewhere, are among examples of
struggles against fascism. _These cases and earlier ones -confirm that Europ~ peoples have
long been capable of wielding nonviolent struggle. That makes its future planned use realistic;
There are a nm,:nber of cases of improvised nonviolent struggle for defense against
'

.

internal and external attacks that are especially relevant for our discussion. In these cases the
resistance began quickly after the attack and had the explicit or tacit support of the government
and often of major institutions of the society. Not all of the struggles succeeded, btit'much can
be learned from.them; they can provide important insights into the dynamics and problems of
such conflicts. In all of Jhese cases, however, there had been no planning, preparations, or
tn,rining for this type o~ defense struggle. . . . Onl~ rough sketches of each case are prqvided
here ...

Germany 1923. 5 The German struggle in the Ruhr against the French and Belgian
· occupation was probably the first case of nonviolent resistance as official government policy

5 This account is based on that of Wolfgang Stern:;tein, ·"The Ruhrkampf of 1923," in Adam
Roberts, editor, The Strategy of Civilian Defence (London: Faber & Faber, 1967) and U. S.
edition: Civilian Resistance as a National Defense (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: 1968), pp. 106135.
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against foreign aggressors. The invasion aimed to secure scheduled payments of heavy war
reparations and to gain other political objectives, incl~ding separation

of the Rhineland from

Germany.
The German official policy of noncooperation had been decided upon only days before
the invasion. There had been no preparations. Trade unions had strongly urged adoption of
the policy. The G.erman govepiment was to finance the resistance, The means of resistance
included refusal to obey orders of the occupation forces, nonviolent acts of defiance, the
refusal of coal mine. owners to serve the invaders, massive demonstrations at courts during
trials of resisters, refusal of ~orkers to run th~ railroads for the French, the dismantling of·
equipment, publication of banned newspapers, posting of resistance proclamations and posters,
and refusal to mine coal.
· Resistance was complicated by vap,ous types of sabotage, including demolitions, which
sometimes killed occupation personnel. r'fhis sabotage divided many supporters in the
'
.

'

resistanc~, and demolitions reduced the international shi(t of sympathy tow·ard ·Germa.ny.

.

.

.

Severe repr~ssion followed. Unemployment, inflation, and hunger were rampant. The unity
'

.

of the resistance and to a large extent even the will to resist were fil}ally broken.
On 26 September the German governrri~nt called off the noncooperation campaign, but
the sufferings of the population tncreased.
. Many Belgians protested against their government's actions: Some French people
advocated the German cause. Toward the end of 1923 Prime Minister Poihcare admitted to
the French National Assembly that his policies had failed. Germany co~ld not clai~ victory,•
but the French and Belgian invaders had achieved neither their economic nor their political .
objectives. The.Rhineland was not detached from Germany. Britain and the United States
intervened and secured a redu~tion of reparations payments, and occupation forces were
withdrawn by iune 1925.
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Czechoslovakia 1968-1969. 6 This case constitutes the most significant attempt thus far
of using nonviolent resis~ce for national defense ag~nst foreign aggression. Ultimately, the
result was defeat, but not quickly. For eight months the Czechs and Slovaks held off the
. complete subjection of their country.
On 21 August 1968 the "allied socialist" forces, led by the Soviet Union, invaded
Czechoslovakia in order to enable pro...:Moscow hard-line Communists -to stage. a coup d'etat to
replace the reform regime of Alexander Dubcek. Top Czechoslovak leaders were kidnapped
by the KGB, and President Svoboda was held under house arrest. ·
As the invasion began, Czechoslovak troops were ordered to stay in ~heir barracks ·
'

while a v~ry different type of resistance to the invasion was waged. Employees of the government news agency refused to issue a press release-that Czechoslvak Communists had
'

-requested the invasion. The President refused to sign a document from a group of Stalinist
Communists.
Government officials, party lea~ers, and organizations denounced the invasion. The
National Assembly demanded the release of arrested leaders and the immediate withdrawal of
-

-

foreign troops. The clandestine defense radio (prepared for use in case .of a NATO in':'asion)
convened the Extraordinary Fourteenth Party Congress, called one-hour general strikes, asked
.rail workers to slow transport. of Russian communications-tracking and jamming equipment,
and discouraged collaboration. It was fmpossible to find sufficient collaborators to set up a
puppet regime. People removed street signs.and house numbers, and changed road direction
signs to frustrate the invaders.
Unable to control the situation·, Soviet officials brought President Svoboda to Moscow
for negotiations, but he insisted, and achieved, the presence of _other arrested Czechoslovak

6 This account is based on Robert Littell; editor, The Czech Black Book (New York: Praeger,
1969); Robin Remington, editor, Winter in Prague (CamQridge, Mass.:·M.I.T. Press, 1969);
and Vladimir Horsky, Prag 1968 (Stuttgart~ Ernst Klett Verlag and Muriich: Kosel-Verlag,
1975). See also H. Gordon Skilling, Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution (Princeton, N.
J.: Princeton University Press, 1976).
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leaders. In Moscow, Czechoslovak leaders agreed to a compromise..:-probably a major
strategic error--sacrificing some of the reforms while returning the reform leaders to their
positions. For a week the general population refused to accept the compromise, seeing it as a
defeat. The Soviet officials shifted from military action to a series of incremental political
pressures.
,\

The reform regime and many of the reforms were maintained, despite Soviet pressures,
from August 1968 to April 1969. This was eight months, infinitely longer than the
<

•

~·

Czechoslovak military _could possibly have held back a determined Soviet attack. During this
period Czechoslovakia generally functioned normally despite the presence of Soviet troops,
which were not used for repression. Then, in April antic-Soviet rioting provided the pretext for
,new Soviet demands. The Czechoslovak officials capitulated, ousting the Dubcek reform
group and repla~ing' it with the harder line Husak regime. Certain limited types of re~istance
continued. It is estimated that there were about fifty Czech and Slovak deaths and some
-

'

hundreds wounded. The Husak regime continued persecution of dissidents and human rights
advocates until the demise of Communist rule in the face of a nonviolent uprising in fate 1989-the "velvet revolution"--when once again,the people acted as though Soviet troops were not
occupying their country.

The Soviet Union 1991. 1 On 18 August 1991 in an effort to block the radical
decentralization of power in the Soviet Union, a g!oup 'of hard-line Soviet officials detained
Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and demanded that he tum over all executive powers to
his vice-president. Gorbachev refused.
The self-declared "State Committee for the State of Emergency" --c9mposed of, am.ong
others, the Soviet vice'"president, prime minister, defense minister, chairman of the KGB, and
7 This account of the August 1991 Soviet coup has been prepared by Bruce Jenkins. It is
compiled from th,e following sources: The Boston Globe,-20-23 August 1991; The Economist,
24-30 August 1991; Stuart H. Loory and Ann Imse, Seven Days That Shook The World, CNN
Reports, (Atlan~: Turner Publishing, Inc.: 1991); Newsweek, 2 September 1991; The New
Yorker, 4 November 1991; The New York Times, 20-25 August 1991; Time, 2 September
1991; The Washington Post, 21 August 1991.
·
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interior minister--declared a six-month "state of emergency." Opposition newspapers were
banned, political parties .suspended (except the Communist Party), and demonstrations
forbidden. The junta's first decree asserted the primacy of the Soviet constitution over those
of the republics and mandated adherence to all orders of the Emergency Committee.
At first it seemed .that the junta had the entire military forces of the Soviet Union at
their disposal. Armored divisions and paratroops were deployed throughout Moscow. In the
Baltics, pro-coup forces seized telephone, radio and television facilities and blockaded key
ports. Armored assault units outside of Leningrad began to move on the city.
In Moscow, tens of thousands of people gathered spontaneously in the streets to
denounce the coup. In a dramatic show of defiance, Russian Federation President Boris
Yeltsin climbed upon a hostile tank and denounced the putschists action as a "rightist,
reactionary, anti-constitutional coup." Yeltsin proclaimed "all decisions and instructions of
this committee to b~ unlawful" and appealed to citizens to rebuff the putschists and for
servicemen not to take part in the coup. Yeltsin concluded with an appeal for a "universal
unlimited strike." Later that day Yeltsin ordered army and KGB personnel within the Russian
republic to obey him, not the putschists.
Thousands gathered in front of the Russian "White House" (parliament building) to
protect it from attack. Barricades were erected; trolley buses and automobiles blocked the
streets. Although the call for a general strike went largely unheeded, miners in the Kuzbass
coal fields and near Sverdlosk did strike.
The putchists decreed a special state of emergency in Moscow because of "rallies,
street m.µ-ches, demonstrations and instances of instigation to riots." On the second night of
the coup, resistance organizers pasted leaflets throughout-the city's subway system calling for a
mass demonstration in front of the "White House" the following day.
In Leningrad, 200,000 people rallied in response to Mayor Anatoly Sobchak's call for
"the broadest constitutional resistance" to' the coup. Tens of thousands in Moldavia blocked
the streets to keep Soviet troops at bay. Leaders of the Ukraine and Kazakhstan denounced the
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coup.· A large rally in Minsk called for mass civil disobedience. Lithuanian President
Landsberg1s appealed to citizens to surround the parliament building in Vilnius for protection
from attack. Emergency sessions of the parliaments of Latvia and Estonia declared full
independence from the Soviet Union.

In Moscow, banned opposition newspapers secretly printed "The Common Paper"
which called on citizens to resist.. A donated radi,o transmitter allowed the Russian government
to broadcast .resistance information across the nation thro.ugh local relay stations. -·The banned
independent radio station "Echo Moscow" continued to broadcast, carrying live speeches from
an emergency session of the Russian parliament. Although banned, Russian Television.
technicians put their news programs on video tape and distributed them to twenty cities around
.the Soviet Union.
Officials in the state controlled media refused cooperation with the putschists. The
defiant speeches of Yeltsin and Sobchak were aired on the nightly news program which the
I

Emergency Committee's KGB censor choose not to block. Aftierwards, the First Deputy
Chairman of Soviet Television, Valentin Lazutkin, received a call from Interior Minister
Pugo: "You have disobeyed two orders ... You have given instructions to the people on where
to go and what to do. You will answer for this." Defiant crowds swelled in front of the
White House that night to protect the,Russian government.
Concerted efforts were made to undermine the loyalty of the putschists' forces.
Leaflets and food were distributed to soldiers. Citizens pleaded with tank crews to switch
sides. Yeltsin urged discipline: "Don't provoke the military. The military has become a
weapon in the hands of the putschists. Therefore we should also support the military and
maintain order and discipline in contact with them."
In several cases, entire military units deserted the putschists. Ten tanks in front of the
White House turned their turrets away from the parliament building, pledging to help defend it
against attack. Mutinies against the p_utschists were reported at the Leningrad Naval Base and
i

at a paratrooper training academy. Units in the Far East refused to support the junta. In the
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Russian republic, local interior ministry police and KGB units declared loyalty to Yeltsin.
Defense Minister Yasov ordered the Tula division to withdraw from_its positions near.the
White House because of the troops' uncer~n loyalty. Interior Minister Pugo disbanded the
Moscow police out of fear of disloyalty to the putschists.
In the afternoon of the second day of the coup, the putschists attempted to· put together ·
a new assault• team to attack the Russian White House. Army paratroops apd Interior ministry
forces were to surround the White House, clearing the way for an attack by the elite KGB
Alpha Group .. The head of the Army's paratroops and the commander of the Soviet.Air
Force, however, refused to_ take part in the attack. Hours before the planned attack, the
commander of the KGB Alpha Group stated that his forces would not take part. "There· will
be no attack. I won't go against the people."
The following morning, the Defense Board of the Soviet Union voted to withdraw the
troops from Moscow. Members of the Emergency Committee were subsequently arrested (one
committed suicide). President Gorbachev returned to power. Casualties were low--a total of
five people were killed during the coup attempt.
The coup had been defeated. Mass public defiance and disobedience in the military
thwarted the hard-liners attempt to return to authoritarian rule.

Advancin2 from the past
These cases of civilian resistance for national defense are not examples of civilian,

,

based defense, for they were all improvised and lacked the advantages of planning,
..

preparations, and ·training--elements that are regarded as essential by theorists of this policy.
'

To draw a patall~l, imagine completely unprepared military action--lacking strategists,
planning, organized fighting forces, a command structure, weaponry and ammunition,
contingency planning, communications, and transportation. Such improvised military action is
not likely to be effective, if it is eve~ possible. However, these are the circumstances in which
civilian resistance for defense has normally operated in the past. It is now possible to give the
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advantages of preparations, which military struggle has had for centuries, to the forces of
people power for defense.
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Part Three·
DIRECT DEFENSE OF THE SOCIETY

Civilian-based defense

The term "civilian-based defense" indicates defense by civilians (as distinguished from
military personnel) using civilian 'means· of struggle (as distinct from military or paramilitary
means). As indicated.earlier, the objectives of civilian-based defense are to deter and defeat
"

both internal usurpations and international aggression. This is done by developing a prepared
capacity of the civilian population to wa~e noncooperation and defiance against potential
attackers, using social, economic, political, and psychological "weaporis" (qr specific methods
of action). Weapons of violence are not required, and would in fact be counterproductive.
Employing these weapons, civilian defenders would aim to:
D· make the attacked society unrulable by internal or foreign aggressors;
I maintain control and self-direction by the defenders of their own society;

II resist effectively the imposition of an unwanted government over the population;
ll make the institutions of the society into omnipresent resistance organizations;
■ .deny

the attackers' their objectives;

I make
. .the costs of the attack and attempted domination unacceptable to the .attackers;
II subvert the reliability and loyalty of the attackers' troops and functionaries and induce

them to mutiny;
I report the attack, resistance, and repression to the population of the attackers'
h?meland or their usual supporters;
Ill encourage dissention and opposition among the attackers.' home population and usual
supporters;

IJ stimulate international ·opposition to the attack by diplomatic, economic, and public
opinion pressures against the attackers; and
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I achieve international support for the defenders in communications, finances, food,
diplomacy; and other resources.
An effective societal defense is possible because neither a .coup nor an invasion
immediately gives the attackers their specific objectives and control of the population, society,
and governmental structure. Even in the absence of resistance, those objectives and control
take time and effort to achieve. In the face of well-prepared noncooperation and defiance, the
/

achievement of those ends may not only be slowed, .but may be blocked by a skilled and
determined civilian population.

Deterrence

As with military security policies, civilian-based defense works best when it helps to
prevent an attack. Therefore, a key aim of this policy is.to help dissuade ~d deter any
possible attacker. The deterrence capacity of civilian-based defense has two key elements: the ·
actual ability of the society to defend itself, and the potential attackers' perception of that
ability. Potential aggressors may conclude that if the objectives of the attack are likely to be
thwarted, bringing unacceptable costs to them, then it might be best to cancel the whole plan.
Therefore, understanding the deterrence capacity of civilian-based defense depends on
understanding the actual defense strategies and capacities of this policy.
Any deterrence policy, whether military-based or civilian-ba~ed, can fail, for any
· number of reasons. In contrast to nuclear deterrence, however, if civilian-based deterrence
fails, the policy of civilian-based defense still provides. a viable defense option to combat the
attack without the risk of massive destpl~tion and immense casualties. ·
Herewith we find a major
distinction in the way deterrence is produced
through nuclear
r
.
· weapons from how it could be prpduced by civilian-based defense. Civilian-based deterrence
. would not be produced by the threat of massive physical destruction and death on the
attackers' homelaJ?.d, as nuclear and high tech conventional military weaponry does. Instead,
this deterrence would be produced by the actual capacity to defend successfully.
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How is this type of deterrence possible? Invasion is, of course, not an objective in and
of itself. It is a way to achieve a wider purpose, which almost alwa)'.s involves occupation of
the invaded country. Similarly, in a coup d'etat, the seizure of buildings, transportation and
communication centers, and key geographical points is not done for its own sake, but rather to
control the state apparatus and thereby the country. By securing such broad control of the
country, the aggressors hope to achieve the specific objectives of the attack.
Whether the aim of the attack is political domination, economic exploitation,
ideological indoctrination, or some other, achievement of the aim will most likely require the
cooperation of at least part of the inhabitants of the attacked country. If it is clear that such
cooperation will be firmly denied, the attackers may reconsider whether their objectives can
actually be obtained ..
If a successful invasion is clearly to be followed by immense difficulties in occupying

and controlling the country, its society, and population, then the invasion's apparent "success"
in the easy entry of its military forces will be revealed as a dangerously misleading mirage.
Certainly the Russians invading Czechoslovakia in August 1968 encountered in the early stages
great and unanticipated ,difficulties caused by various types of nonviolent noncooperation and
defiance. Preparations and training for civilian-based defense could have increased ~hese
difficulties considerably. Where preparations and training are thorough, a would-be invader
might perceive that it will not be possible to rule successfully the country that might be so
easily invaded.

Civilian-based defense has at that moment been revealed as a powerful

deterrent.
There are other contingencies that potential attackers would need to consider. A

.

population's spirit and methods of resistance could well spread to other populations that the
attackers would prefer to remain passive, such as their home populace generally or aggrieved
minorities and oppressed groups.
For these various reasons, civilian-based defense has to be considered as a possible
non-nuclear deterrent to both conventional attack and coups d'etat.

Fi&htin& with civilian weapons
The development of wise defense strategies . . . will be s~gnificantly influenced by full
awareness of the range of methods of resistance, or "weapons," which are available for the
defense struggle.
One hundred ninety:-eight specific methods of nonviolent action have been identified,
and there are certainly scores more. These methods are classified _under three broad
categories: protest and persuasion, noncooperation, and intervention.. Methods of nonviolent
protest and persuasion are largely symbolic demonstrations, including parades, marches, and
vigils "(54 methods). Noncooperation is divided into three sub-categories: (a) social
noncooperation (16 methods), (b) economic noncooperation, including boycotts (26 methods)
and strikes (23 methods), and (c) acts of political noncooperation (38 methods). Nonviolent·
intervention, by psychologicaJ_, physical, social, economic, or political means, such 'as the fast,
nonviolent occupation, and parallel government (41 methods).
The _use of a considerable number of these methods-:-carefully chosen, applied
persistently and on a large scale, wielded in the context of a wise strategy and appropriate
tactics, by trained civilians--is likely to cause any illegitimate regime sev~re problems.
Some methods require people to perform acts unrelated to their normal lives, such as
distributing leaflets, operating an underground press, going on hunger strike, or sitting down
in the streets. These methods may be difficult for some people to undertake except in very
extreme situations.
Other methods of nonviolent struggle instead require people to continue approximately
their normal lives, though in somewhat different ways. For example, people may report for
work, instead of striking, but then deliberately work more slowly or inefficiently than usu~.
"Mistakes" may be consciously made more frequently. One may become "sick" and "unable"
to work at certain tinies. Or, one may simply refuse to work. One might go to church when
the act expresses not only religious but also political convictions. One may act to protect
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children from the attackers' propaganda. One might refuse to.join certain "recommended" or
required organizations that one would not have joined freely in earlier times. The similarity of
such types of action to people's usual activities and the limited degree of departure from their
normal lives may make participation in the national defense struggle much easier for many
people.

In contrast to military-means, the methods of nonviolent struggle can be focused
directly on-the issues at stake. For example, if the issues are primarily political, then political
forms of nonviolent struggle would be crucial. Thes~ would include denial· of legitimacy to
the attackers, noncooperation with the attackers' regime, a puppet government, or the.
putschists. Noncooperation would also be applied against specific policies. At times stalling
· and procrastination or open disobedience may be practiced.
On the.other hand·, if the crux of the conflict is primarily economic, then economic
action, such as boycotts or strikes, may be app~op~ate. An attempt by the .attackers to exploit
the economic system might be met with limited general strikes, slow-downs, refusal of
assistance by; or disappearance of, indispensable experts, and the selective use of various types
of strikes at key points in ind~stries, in transportation systems, arid in the supply of raw
materials.
Nonviolent struggle produces change in four ways. When members of the opponent
group are 'emotionally moved by the ·courageous nonviolent resisters suffering repressi~n or ·
ratipnally influenced by the justness of their cause, they may come around to a new viewpoip.t
which positively accepts the resisters' aims. This mechanism is called conversion. Though
cases of convers~on in nonviolent action do sometimes happen, they are rare, and in most
conflicts this does not occur at all or at least not on a significant scale.
· Far more often, nonviolent struggle operates by changing the conflict situation and the
society so -that the opponents simply cannot do as they like. It is this change which produces
the other three mechanisms: accommodation, nonviolent coercion, and_disintegration. Which

)
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I!

.

of these-occurs depends on the :degree to which the conflict situation and the society are

I

changed duri~g the struggle.

.

If the issues are not fun~amental ones and the contest of forces has altered the power
i

F even basis, the immediate conflict may be ended by reaching

relationships to approximately

I

an agreement, a splitting of differences or compromise._ This mechanism is called
accommodati~n. Many strikesf are settled in this-manner, forexample, with both sides
attaining some of their objecth~es but neither achieving all it wanted.
I

However, nonviolent st;ruggle can- be much more powerful than indicated by the
mechanisms of conversion- or- ,ccommodatibn. Ma~s noncooperation and defiance can so
change social and political situ~ti~ns-, especially power r~latipnships, that the opponents' ability
'

to control the ,situatio_n is in fa9t taken aw~y despite their continued efforts to secure their
.

'

original objectives. _For example, .the opponents may be unable to control or crush the
I

,

-

widespread disruption ofnorm:al economic, social, or political pro_cesses. The opponents'
military forces may have becotne so unreliable th.at they no longer si~ply obey orders to
repress resisters. Although th~ opponents' leaders remain in their positions, and adhere to
I

,

•

their original goals, their ability to act effectively has been taken away from them. 'That is
called nonviolent coercion.

1

l

I

In some extreme situations, the conditions producing nonviolent coercion are carried
still furj:her. The opponents'· \ead~rship in fact loses al~ a~ility to act and _their o~n structure of
power collapses. The resister~' self-direction, noncooperation and defiance become so
'

•

i

-

>

•••

complete that the opponents now lack even a semblance of control over them. The opponents'
i

i

.•

bureaucracy refuses to obey i(s own leadership and their orders. -The opponents' troops and
-

-

I

-

police mutiny. The opponents' usual supporters or population repudiate their former ·
I

I

•

leadership, denying that they pave any right to rule at all. Hence, their former assistance and
.

I

-

_obedience falls away. The fourth mechanism of change, disintegration of the opponents'
t

system, is so complete that th~y do not even have sufficient power to surrender.
'

\
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In planning defense strategies, these four mechanisms should be kept in mind. The
selection of one or more preferred mechanism of change in a conflict will depend on numerous
factors, including the absolute and relative power of the contending groups. It should be
remembered that at any given time in a conflict the exist~ng power capacities of the contenders
are only temporary. Due to the forces applied in the struggle and their consequences, the
power of each side can change rapidly, rising or falling in response to what is done in the
course of the conflict.

Defen din~ the society itself, not borders
One of the ways in which civilian-based defense differs from conventional military
defense is that it focuses on defense of the society by the society itself, on social and political
space, not defense of points of geography, terrain, or physical space.
Military forms of defense are often assumed to be able to hold back attackers at the
frontier. However, for most of the twentieth century military means have been in fact
incapable of effective frontier defense. The introduction of the airplane, tank, jet,_ and rocket,
has in most cases abolished the possibility of effecti~e geographical defense--that is protection
of the territory and everyone and everything within it by exclusion of attacking forces and
weapon_s. Indeed, battles over territory often result in massive deaths and physical destruction
of the society being "defended. 11
Instead of attempting to provide defense by fighting over geographical points, people
applying civilian-based defense actively defend their way' of life, society, and freedoms
directly. The priorities of action are crucial. The maintenance of a free press, for example, or•
keeping the attackers' propaganda out of the schools, is of more direct importance to
democracy and independence than, say, possession of a given mountain or building, or the
killing of young conscripts in the invaders' army.
This type of direct defense of the society· has been powerfully demonstrated in struggles
in Poland. Despite brutal repression and massive killings during the Nazi-occupation (1939-
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1945), for example, the Polish people managed to keep in operation a whole underground
school system. 8 During the period of martial law in the 1980s, the Poles, led by the trade
union Solidarity, had great success in keeping their non-state insti~utions independent and
operating. This situation has been described as the Communist military dictatorship bobbing
around on the surface of the society, able to thrust damaging blows on occasion down into it,
but never able to change or control the society fundamentally. It was this powerful capacity of
the Polish society to maintain defiant self-direction___that ultimately doomed the Communist
dictatorship:
Although civilian-based defense cannot defend geographic borders, some limited
,stalling actions _could be taken at the initial stage of ah attack. For example, the deployment of
troops could be delayed by obstructionist activities at the docks (if the troops came by sea), by
·refusal to operate the railroads, or by blocking highways and airports with thousands of
abandoned automobiles. These and other· steps, however, would be only a symbolic prelude to
the substantive resistance.

The role of social institutions·
In order to establish political control, at some point an occupation regime or new
illegitimate "government" will most likely attack the society's independent institutions. In this
situation the defense of these institutions becomes a major fighting front. Independent social,·
economic, and political institutions provide the core structures upon which a civilian-based
defense policy would rely. Often, these attacks will be made in ord,er to destroy the resistance
capacity of the society. At other times, such attacks may be part of a totalitarian schell).e,
seeking to atomize and then remake the society in the totalitarian image.
If the attackers do gain control of the courts, schools, unions, cultural groups,
professional societies, religious institutions, and the like, the future capacity for resistance will
8 Jan Karski, Story of a.Secret State (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1944).
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be weakened for a long period. ·Therefore, civilian-based defense must firmly resist any
efforts of the invader to control the s9ciety's institutions.
How could tI:ese institutions defend themselves and the society from the attackers? A

.

.few examples wil\ show how this could be done.
The courts, declaring the attackers an illegal· and unconstitutional body, would continu~
to operate on the basis of pre-invasion laws and constitutions, and they would refuse to give
moral support to the invader, even if they had to close the courts. Order would then be
maintained by social pressures, solidarity, and nonviolent sanctions: Underground courts have
been used in some situations, especialiy against collaborators. In Poland, for example, during
I

the Ger111:an occupation the underground government's Directorate of Civilian Resistance used
.

.

·the "sentence of infamy'' requiring social boycott of the declared collaborator as

I

an alternative

to a death sentence. 9
Attempts to control the school curriculum would be met with the teachers' and
administrato~s• refusal to fntroduce the attackers' propaganda. Teachers would explain to the
pupils the issues at stake. Regular education would continue as lof).g as possible, and then if
necessary the school buildings would be closed and private classes held in the children's
homes.. These forms of _resis~ce occurred in Norway during the Nazi occupation. 10
Trade unions and prof~ssional groups could resist the attackers' domination by abiding.
by their pre-invasion constitutions and procedures, denying recognition to new organizations
'

.

set up by or for the invader; refusing'to Pc!.Y dues or attend meetings of any new pro-invader
organization, and by carrying out disruptive strikes, boycotts, and forms of political
noncooperation. Organizations and associations could continue. their activities underground
9 Karski, The Story of a Secret State, p. 235.
10 See Gene Sharp, "Tyranny Could Not Quell Them"· (pamphlet) (London: P~ce News,
1958 and later editions); Magnus Jensen, "Kampen om Skolen," in Sverre Steen, general
editor, Norges Krig (Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1947-1950), vol. III, pp. 73-105; Sverre
S. Amundsen, gen. ed., Kirkenes Ferda. 1942 (Oslo: J. W. Cappelens Forlag, ·1946); and
· Magne Skodvin, general editor, Norge i Krig, vol. 4, Holdningskamp by Beit N~kleby (Oslo:
H. Aschehoug & Co. [W. Nygaard], 1986), pp. 72-121.
·
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when faced with take-over attempts by the attackers, as did many Norwegian groups when
fascist officials attempted to establish control over voluntary and professional organizations. 11
These examples _illustrate how organizations and institutions c~mld deny legitimacy to
and refuse coop~iation with attackers. The cumulative impact of such structural
/
noncooperation is to prevent the attackers from controlling the society. That prevention makes
.

futu!e resistance more· possible and effective. It helps to block the attackers from achieving
their specific objectives, 'and contributes to the collapse of the whole venture ..

NeutralizinK the attackers' troops
-

.

Initial obstructionist activities and acts of nonviolent resistance against the deployment
of troops would make clear to the individual attacking soldiers that, whatever they might have
been told, they were not welcome as an invasion force or as enforcers of the putsch, as the
case may be.· In order -to communicate determination to resist, the people also could wear
mourning bands, stay at home, stage a limited general strike, or defy curfews. The invader's
parades of troops through the cities could be met by conspicuously empty streets and shuttered .
.-

.

windows, and any public receptions would be boycotted. Such actions would give notice to
friend and foe that the occupation will be firmly resisted, ahd at the same time the people's
morale will be bµilt up so as to prevent submission and collaboration.
The specific tactics .used by resisters to influence the troops would need to be decided
•by ~he -resistance leadership. Each country and situation would have its own conditions and
circumstances:_ In almost every case, however, efforts would be made to undermine the
loyalty of individual soldiers and functionaries. The p~pulace could urge the invading soldiers
not to believe tµeir leaders' propaganda. The soldiers and functionaries would be informed
that there· will be resistance, but that the resistance will-be of a special type, directed against
11 See Magne Skodvin, "Norwegian Nonviolent Resistance During"the German Occupation,"
in Adam Roberts, editor, The Strategy of Civilian Defence/ Civilian Resistance as a National
Defense, pp. 141-151; and Thomas Christian Wyller, Nyordning og Motstand (Oslo:
Universitetsforlaget, 1958).
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the attempt

to seize control b~t without threatening harm to tliem as individuals.

If this could

be communicated, they might be more likely to help the resisting population in small ways, to
avoid brutalities, and to mutiny at a crisis point, than they would if they expected at any
moment to be killed by snipers or bombs.
In some situations, the troops would be treated with "fraternization without
-collaboration," a tactic of friendly personal. gestures combined with noncooperative political
resistance, which could be aimed to persuade individual soldiers ~d others of the.wrongs of
the attack. In other situations, sold~ers would be socially isolated, treated with the "cold
shoulder." This tactic, commonly praGticed by the Danes against German occupation soldiers
.during the Second World War, is sometimes seen as necessary in order to contribute to the·
soldiers' demoralization and disintegration as a reliable force for repression. 12
There is often a temptation to regard occupation soldiers, or troops of the·putschists, as
being themselves the enemy. Consequently, resisters have at times shown hatred to them,
harassed them, caused them to feel isolated and abandoned, and have even physically beaten or
killed them. This behavior, however, can be highly counterproductive and dangerous to. the
possible success of the resistance. Under those conditions, soldiers will be much more likely
to obey orders to commit brutalities and killings against the resisting population.
Instead, some strategists are convinced, more positive results cfor the defense will occur
if these soldiers are regarded as fellow victims of the aggressors' system. Repeated
•

I

•

demonstrations that there is no violent intent or threat toward them, accompanied by a clear
determination not to submit to the attacking regime, is likely to be most effective. I~- is
believed that this combination of strong resistance··without personal hostility will have a chance
to crea\e morale problems, at least among some of the soldiers . .In Czechoslovakia
immediately after the August 21, 1968 invasion, for example, invasion troops had to .be rotated

of

12 See,. for example, Jeremy Bennett, "The R~sistance Against the German Occupati~n
Denmark 1940-1945," in Adam Roberts, editor, The Strategy of Civilian Defence/ Civilian
Resistance as a National Defense, pp. 154-172
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out of the country due to morale probl~ms. 13 Uncertain loyalty to the attackers' leadership,
/

problems of maintaining self-respect while inflicting repression, inefficiency in carrying out
'

orders, and finally disaffection and even mutiny--all can be exacerbated through the defenders'
resistance without physical attacks on soldiers and_ functionaries.
The opponents' troops may, of course, despite such·a non-threatening stance, still
perpetrate brutalities. The killing of nonviolent demonstrators.attempting to block seizure of
the television tower in Vilnius, Lithuania, on 13 Jan·uary 1991, demonstrates this danger.
.
.
'
Nevertheless, it is significant that a Russian military correspondent (who later left the
army) interviewed on Vilnius radio just after the tragic events at the television tower said
approximately: "The Soviet military are at a loss how to deal with these nonresisting people:
this no~violent struggle is like a bone in their throat. " 14 He added that many soldiers and
noncommisstoned officers._in the Vilnius garrison felt dejected and completely lost after the
massacre, and that in the city of Kaunas, garrison soldiers said they would never shoot
civilians.
The above incident is an isolated case, but it does at least demonstrate the potential of
nonviolent resistance to contribute to the undermining of the reliability of the attackers I troops.
It points to. the potential of talcing the attackers I army away from them through this unique type
!

-

of struggle.

Weaknesses of dictatorships

In facing dictatorships, especially extreme ones, effective resistance sometimes seems
impossible. It is rarely recognized that all dictatorial systems .contain critical weaknesses in the
form of inefficiencies, internal conflicts, and other factors contribu~ing to impermanence. 15 It
13 See Robert Littell, editor, The Czech Black Book, p. 212.
14 Letter from Grazvydas Kirvaitis, 7 March 1991.
15 See Gene Sharp, "Facing Dictatorships_ with Confidence, 11 in Social Power and Political
Freedom (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1980), pp. 91-112.
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is precisely these features that offer themselves up for exploitation by civilian-based defense
strategists.
Seventeen specific weaknesses of extreme dictatorships have been identified, including
the following: 16
111 The cooperation of a multitude of people and groups which is needed to operate the
system may be restricted or withdrawn.

I The_system may become routine in its operation, therefore more moderate and less
able to shift its activities drastically at the service of doctrinal imperatives and sudden
)

policy changes.
I The central command may receive from the lower echelons inaccurate or incomplete
information on which to make decisions because of the subordinates' fear of
punishments for accurate reporting, thereby inducing displeasure from higher echelons.

I Ideology may erode, and the myths and symbols of the system may become unstable.
I Firm adherence to the ideology may lead to decisions infurious to the system because
insufficient attention is given to actual conditions and needs.
I The system may become inefficient and ineffective due to deteriorating competency
and effectiveness of the bureaucracy, or due to ~xcessive controls and red tape.
I The system's internal personal, institutional, and policy conflicts may detrimentally
affect and even disrupt its operation.

I Intellectuals. and students may become restless in response to conditions, restrictions,
doctrinalism, and repression.
j

I The general public, inst~d of supporting the dictatorship, may over time become
apathetic or skeptical.

16 This list in part draws upon Karl W. Deutsch, "Cracks in the Monolith: Possibilities and
Patterns of Disintegration in Totalitarian Systems," in Carl J. Friedrich, Totalitarianism (New
York: Universal Library, Grosset&, Dunlap, 1964), pp. 308-333. Original edition,
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1954.

38

· I When a dictatorship is new, time is required for it to become firmly established,
allowing an especially vulnerable period when it is highly vulnerable to disruption and
dysfunction.
11 The extreme concentration of decision-making and command means that too many

decisions will be made by too few people, thus increasing the chances of errors.
II If the regime, in order to avoid some of these problems, decides to diffuse decisionmaking and administration, this will lead to further erosion of central controls, and
often to the creation of dispersed new power centers.
While such weaknesses guarantee nothing, they do illustrate that vulnerable aspects of
dictatorial rule exist. These vulnerable points can be identified and appropriate forms of
resistance can be concentrated at them. Such action is compatible with the nature of civilianbased defense.
The basic reason why civilian-based defense can be effective against brutal dictatorships
is that even such extreme political systems cannot free themselves entirely from dependence on
their subjects. As an articulated strategy, civilian-based defense is designed to deny dictatorial
rulers the compliance, cooperation, and submission they require.
Nonviolent resistance has occurred against totalitarian and other dictatorial systems, on
an improvised basis. withm1t training, preparations, and know-how. Totalitarians like Hitler
deliberately sought to discourage potential resistance by promoting an exaggerated impression
of their regime's omnipotence, both domestically and internationally.

Preparations for civilian-based defense
The decision to adopt, prepare, and eventually wage this type of defense requires the
,,

support of the defending population, for in civilian-based defense the whole society becomes a
nonviolent fighting force. Active support and participation of v~st segments of the population,
as well as of the society's major institutions, is essential. The citizens must have both the will
and the ability to defend their societies against threats to their freedom and independence.
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The need for a willingness to defend does not imp~y that the population must believe
their system and society to be perfect. It does mean, however, that they see their system to be
preferable to any regime likely to be imposed by putschists or by foreign invaders. The
pop9lation may recognize that their social system may ~till have problems, but believe that any
desired changes ·should be· made by their own democratic decisiol), not by attackers.
Peacetime improvements in the social, political, and economic· conditions of society are
likely both to reduce grounds for collaboration by aggrieved groups and to increase
commitment to defense by the general populace in the event of a crisis. In tum, measures to
increase.the effectiveness of civilian-based defense by social improvements and greater
participation in social institutions and defense are lilcely to enhance the vitality of democratic
society. With this policy there is no necessary contradiction between defense requirements and
domestic social needs.
_Defense by nonviolent noncooperation and defiance has at titnes been improvised, as
the prototypical examples from Germany, France, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union
- show, with some highly positive resl.llts. However, in defense crises, high motivation and
spontaneity" are insufficient to ensure victory. It is now possible to move beyond spontaneity
to increase the effectiveness of noncooperation and defiance in defern~e.
This is not to say that there is no role for spontaneity in this policy. Good motives and
creative spontaneity can be helpful, but need to be relied 1,1pon with restraint because they can
have negative results. Spontaneity can lead people to disrupt the application of a sound
.

'

strategy; distract attention to less significant issues and activities; create situations in which
harsh repression produces unnecessary casualties; and facilitate counterproductive violence by
the resisters. "Productive" spontaneity needs to be self.:-disciplined and rooted in a thorough
understanding of the requirements of the nonviolent technique and of the chosen civilian-based
defense s,trategies.
Civilian-based defense is most likely to be effective if it is waged by the population and
its institutions on the basis of advance preparation, planning, and training, d~rived from
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research into nonviolent struggle, the attackers' system, arid its weaknesses. The policy will
be stronger in proportion to the extent and quality of the preparations for waging it.
A major_ educational program for the whole country on the nature· and purpose of
civilian-based defense would therefore be required. People would be encouraged to study this
policy individually and in groups, and to discuss"it in their'families, neighborhoods, and
organizations. Governmental bodies at various levels and independent institutions--such as
schools, churches, trade unions, .business groups, newspapers, television stations, and the
like--could undertake
this educational
effort. People would_ be informed, and inform.
.
.
.

themselves, about the broad outlines of the policy, the ways it would operate, the requirements
for its effectiveness, and the results expected. This would help people decide if they wanted to
adopt such a policy and, if so, would help them to prepare for it.
Certain occupational groups would need_particular types of training. Communications
and transportatipn workers, religious leaders, police, military officers and troops (if the army
. remained), educators, printers, factory managers, workers, and more--all would require
specific action guidelines about ho_w their particular activities and responsibilities could be
turned toward effective forms of nonviolent resistance.
In addition to the general population and certain professional groups, there may be a
role for specialists in civilian-based defense. Training of civilian-based defense specialists would vary in its character and purpose, ranging from imparting the skills that are required by
local neighborhood defense workers to developing the incisive strategic acumen needed to help
plan broad campaigns. The latter might require advanced specialized .study.
/

Specialists in civilian-based defense might play an important role in initiating resistance
in crises. In some situations these specialists could serve as special cadres for carrying out
particularly dangerous tasks. Other specialists might _be kept in_ reserve to guide later stages of
the resistance. However, the main thrust of civilian-based defense must be assumed by the
general population. Since the defense leaders generally would be among .the first people
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imprisoned or otherwise incapacitated by the attackers, the population must be able to continue
the defense struggle on its own initiative.
Preparations for civilian,...based defense would· not consist simply of instructions issued
by a centralized leadership to be implemented at the lower levels. Development of an effective
strategy would require an analysis of the resistance potential of many sectors, such as the
· transportation system and personnel, government departments, schools, communication media,
and so forth. The objective would be (o identify the specific points at which noncooperation
might have a maximum impact against any attempt by attackers to seize.control of the society
and to gain specific objectives. People working in such places would often be the.best sources
of the information needed to make those decisions about resistance. To make accurate tactical
judgements, however, one would also need to know the forms of nonviolent action, strategic
.

r

.

principles of nonviolent resistance, the attackers' weaknesses, the kinds of repression to
expect, the crucial political issues on which to resist, and other practical points.
The organization of an underground system of contacts would probably have to wait
until a crisis, in order to make it harder for the opponents to know the exact personnel and
structure of the resistance. However, in peacetime "war ~ames" could offer civilian-based
d_~fense specialists an advance opportunity to examine the viability of alternative defense
strategies and tactics. Also, training maneuvers could be conducted in which imaginary
occupations ·or coups would be met by civilian resistance. These coµld be acted out at levels
ranging from local residential.areas, offices, or factories, to cities, states, regions, and even
the whole country.
Technical preparations would also be necessary for civilian-based defense. Provisions
and equipment would be required for effective communications after the attackers had seized
newspaper facilities, radio stations, and other mas.s media. Equipment to publis~ underground
newspapers and resistance leaflets and to make broadcasts could be hidden beforehand. It
should be posstble to make advance arrangements for locating such broadcasting stations or

J
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printing plants in the territory of a friendly neighboring country as part of a civilian-based
defense mutual aid agreement.
Since attackers might attempt.to force the population into submission by deliberate
_measures to produce starvation, and since certain resistance methods (e.g., a general strike)
could disrupt regular modes· of distribution, emergency supplies of food staples could be
decentralized and &tored locally. Alternative means of providing fuel and water during
emergencies should also be explored. For certain types. of crises in countries with significant
'

.

housing and food supplies in rural or forest areas, plans might be considered for the dispersal
of large groups of people from big cities to those areas where the oppressor would find it more
•

J

difficult to exercise control over them.
~ch country and each defense scenario entails its own set of specific problems and
considerations. Defen~e officials, civilian-based resistance specialists, and various sections of
the general population would need to identify the· specific types of preparations and training
most relevant for their particular conditions, and then to formulate plans to meet those needs.
With conscious. efforts to refine and prepare civilian struggle, it should be possible to
multi~ly the combat strength of nonviolent struggle for civilian-based defense purposes several
times over the power demonstrated in the most successful improvised past nonviolent
struggles, such as those in Poland 1980-1989, East Germany 1989, and Czechosl(?vakia 1989~
1990. That expanded power capacity could be a powerful deterrent and defense ..
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Part Four

A SUPERIOR FORM OF DEFENSE

Consideration and adoption: a transpartisan approach
Whether the pr'oposal is to add a civilian-based resistance component or to transarm to

a full civilian-based defense policy, the pres~ntation,

consideration, and decision should not be

made on an ideological or partisan basis. "Instead, civilian-based options in defense need to be ·
presented ·and evaluated in a "transpartisan" manner--not tied to any doctrinal outlook or
narrow group. 17 . In particular, the policy should in no way be presented as a pacifist or antimilitary concept. On the contrary, in several coun_tries military officers have taken serious,
, posttive interest in the policy. If these civilian-based options are presented on the basis of their
potential utility--without ideological baggage--such a component or policy might well receive
widespread support across much or all of the political spectrum in a democratic society.
Widespread support in the society for a civilian-based resistance component is a
realistic expectation, as potential was demonstrated by the unanimous- decision of the Swedish
parliament in 1986 to adopt a "nonmilitary resistance" component within Sweden's "total
defense" policy. 18 (lri contrast, in the early 1970s in Sweden, presentations of nonviolent .
struggle fot defense were at times made on a highly partisan basis, resulting---=according to the
late Defense Minister Sven Anderson--in a "ten year set back in consideration of the policy.)·
Beyond adoption, a transpartisan approach would aim to incorporate people and groups
holding diverse perspectives in support of the development and implementation of the
component or policy. All sectors ·of the society ought to play important roles not only in 17 The term "transpartisan" was introduced by B~ce Jenkins.
18 The tasks of the Swedish Commission-on Nonmilitary Resistance, established by the
Parliament and Government, were outlined in the Swedish Government ordinance: "SPS
1987:199 Forordning med instruktiort for delegationen for icke-militart: motstind" 23 April
1987.
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. evaluating the component or full policy but, if adopted, in preparing and implementing the
new defense element. It should be remembered that the divtrrse independent organizations and
institutions of the society will be the prime bodies responsible for carrying out the future
policy, not special professional forces.· Hence, the support a'.nd full involvement of those
varied independent bodies is crucial in the development and implementation. of the component
I

or full policy, regardless of their religious, political,· or other differences.
:
I

•

What are the possible patterns of adoption of civiliantbased defense in the Baltics, East
i

Central Europe, and the Commonwealth of Independent Stat~s?
For countries such as Russia, Poland, Hungary, and ~zechoslovakia, which already
.

:

have large military establishments, a rapid full adoption of c~vilian-based defense is virtually
impossible. However, the ability of even these countries in4ependently to defend themselves
I

against both internal and external threats could be significan(ly increased by the addition of a
I
I

.

civilian-based resistance component to their predominantly military defense policies. This
I

.

:

'

would minimally contribute to greater capacity for defense-in-depth, help keep defense
I

i

expenditures manageable, and support a policy of maximum' self-reliance in defense.
Furthermore, in such countries whatever their international defense policy might be, they
would gain significantly by adopting a civilian-based resistance component specifically to
defend against ~ttempted coups d'etat.
For countries with existing military capacities, the pfocess of changing over from an
I

ex1sting military-based defense policy to civilian-based deferise is called transarmament.
:
I

"Disarmament," if understood as the reduction or abandonm;ent of real defense capacity (as
i

distinct from military weaponry), is not involved. Although: at certain stages in the process
•

I

there would be reductions in prior military systems, actual ~efense capacity would not be
I

diminished, but increased, as the superior civilian-based def~nse system is introduced.
I
I

For such countries beginning with a significant mili4TY system, full. adoption of
I

•

civilian-based defense is usually conceived to be achieved -by the incremental process of
..

I

.

transarmament. A small civilian resistance component ~ay !first be added to the otherwise
I
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military-based defense policy. Then, that small component may be gradually expanded in
responsibilities and size. Eventually, the military components ma,y be judged to be superfluous
and even counterproductive, and hence can be phased out fully.
Problems would be encountered during such a transition. When civi_Iian-based
. resistance.components have been "incorporated alongside large military components, the
problems intrinsic to mixing some violence with nonviolent struggle would make it necessary
to separate the military action and the civilian action as much as possi~le. The separation can .

. be at least partially accomplished by distancing the two types of action in time--for ~~ample,
the nonviolent struggle against an invader might start after military resistance has ceased--or by
separation in purposes--for example, civilian-based defen·se might be reserved for resistance
against internal coups while military means are designated against foreign aggressors. This
separation is still not fully satisfactory in terms of effectiveness, and attention is still required
to the tensioµ between the two techniques of defense.
In other, situations, however, when a country does not possess a significant mili~
capacity this model of trans.armament does not apply. Newly independent .countries without an
inherited military force--such as Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia--may ,consider freely what
defense policy would be fl?.OSt realistic, affordable, and effective. Suqh countries might want
to adopt directly a full policy of civilian-based defense, if only becau~e in facing potential
attackers they may have no realistic military option capable of actually defending their
societies. This may be due either to a lack of military capacities, and economic reso_urces to
,procure them or due to the overwhelming military power of potential aggressors.· Civilian- ·
based defense may be their onl)' viable defense option. The adoption of civilian~based defense
~nd preparations for·if could then be made rapidly.
For countries without developed military systems, adoption of full civilian-based
defense would have several distinct advantages. The economic cost wo_uld be low. Yet, the
effective deterrence and defense capacities would be much higher than tq.ey could produce by
military preparations (especially in regard to their potential adversaries).

46

Another important reason why newly independent countries currently without military
systems sJ10uld not embark on establishing them relates to the internal democracy of those
societies. If, say, a newly established or expanded military establishment will be incapable of
really providing external defense, then the role remaining for it is internal. That is, it would
be a powerful institution within that national society and could become a force of repression.
As mentioned, such a force could act against the democratic government in a coup d'etat.
This would 111ake the hard-won new independence taste bitter.
In contrast, a policy of civilian-based defense would not create a military establishment
capable of attempting a coup d'etat. Furthermore, this policy would provide an effective
means of deterring or defeating any political coup or executive usurpation. This anti-coup
capacity, combined with the participation of the population and the society's institutions in
civilian-based defense, would contribute to the development of a more vital internal
democracy.
For these countries that lack a realistic military option, attempting to create both a
serious military-based policy and also a developed civilian-based defense capacity could
produce difficult problems. The division of limited resources and personnel between the two
policies could produce problems (although the civilian policy would always be much less
expensive). Also, as already noted, the military and civilian policies often operate in
contradictory ways; in an actual struggle the military means will tend to undermine major parts
of the dynamics of nonviolent struggle.

Defeatine coups and other usurpations
One defense need in all the countries of East Central Europe, the Baltics, and the
Commonwealth of Independent States is protection against internal attacks. Traditional
military means of defense provide no answer to the dangers of internal attacks short of civil
war, ~hich the forces of democracy are likely to lose. As noted earlier, civilian-based defense
is probably the most effective way to combat internal take-overs. These may appear as coups

/
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_d'etat, or as declarations of martial law intended to halt the trends toward increasing
democracy.
Illegitimate take-overs are well known in the history of the Baltics, East Central
Europe, and the former Soviet Union. The Bolsheviks came to power in Russia with the coup
d'etat of October 1917. In 1926 right-wing army officers imposed a state of emergency and
disbanded the government in Lithuania. 19 The Czechoslovak Communist Party seized state
control in 1948 through a coup d'etat, and in Poland a period of severe.repression against
Solidarity was l~unched by a military coup on 12 December 1981 ..,There are strong grounds for these cotmtries to adopt this civilian-based defense to
prevent and thwart internal attacks on the emerging democratic systems.· Indeed, in several
countries in these regions, the populations are now politicized and aware of this power through
the experiences of their independence and democracy struggles. There ate strong reasons to
believe that.they would be capable of waging successful civilian-based defense against future
attempts to subvert newly formed constitutional democratic governments, as the defeat of the
Soviet coup in August 1991 illustrates ....

Interest in civilian-based defense
Is it realistic to expect that ,both popular and official interest in civilian-based policy
optio~s will develop and grow in the countries of the Baltics, East Central Europe, and, the
Commonwealth of Independent States? There are indications that it will.
Serious interest in civilian-based resistance components within predominantly military
policies and also in full civilian-based defense policies has grown significantly over th(? past
three decades in various countries. There are no·w signs that this interest is maturing_ into a
still modest but higher level of public, political, military, and governmental consideration.

19 Georg von Rauch, The Baltic States: The Years of Independence 1917-1940 (London: C.
Hurst Co. and Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), p. 120.
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Research has already begun on a small scale in a few Western European countries and
in the United States. Political and governmental interest has often exceeded the progress in
research. Austria, Switzerland, and Yugoslavia have at one time or another recognized t~is
type of resistance (called by various names) as a small part of their total cl,efense policies. In
recent decades, Norway, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, and Finland, have undertaken
limited governmental or semi-official studies. Sweden, as mentioned earlier, has already
adopted a civilian-based resistance component into its "total defense" policy. In nearly all
these cases, the policy has been seen only as a component of predominantly military-based
defense postures.
Civilian-based defense has been recognized as relevant to the changing political setting
in Europe, especially as a civilian-based resistance component. Johan J rrrgen Holst,
Norwegian defense minister, has stated:
/

"Civilian-based defense has the potential of constituting an important
complement to traditional military forms of defense. As the destructiveness of
war makes deliberate large-scale war in Europe highly unlikely, civilian-based

(

defense adds to the deterrence of occupation by increasing the costs and burdens
for the potential occupant. Recent events in Eastern Europe have demonstrated
the ability of modem societies to mobilize their populations in a manner that
attracts the immediate attention of the whole world. 020 ·
The steps taken in Lithuania during the independence struggle demonstrate that full
civilian-based defense is possible in such a country. Several ~ey points of a civilian-based
defense policy were contained in a resolution adopted on 28 February 1991, by the Supreme
Council (parliament) of Lithuania. , These included a provision that in case of an active Soviet
occupation "only laws adopted by the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania are
valid." The main provisions read:
20 Johan J~rgen Holst, "Civilian-Based Defense in a New Era" (Monograph No. 2,
Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Albert Einstein Institution, 1990), pp. 14-15.
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"1. To consider illegal all governing structures created in Lithuania by the USSR or its
collaborators, and invalid all the laws, 'oecrees or other acts, court _decision's and administrative
orders issued by them and directed at Lithuania.
"2. AH government institutions of the. Republic of Lithuania and their officials are
obligated not to cooperate with the occupying forces and the individuals who serve their
regime.
· "3. In the event a regime of active occupation is introduced, citizens of the Republic of
Lithuania are asked to adhere to principles of disobedience, nonviolent resistance, and political
and social noncooperation as the primary-means of struggle for independence. 1121
I

In an additional claµse, the Supreme Council did leave open the possibility that citizens ·

'.

· , · of Lithuani~ could use "all available methods and means to defend themselves," a situation
which if expressed in violence could quickly erode the unity and ·strength of a concerted
civilian-based defense posture. !n a further clause, the Supreme Council stated that, if
possible, organized resistance would be launched on instructions of the provisional defense
leadership of Lithuania. As of early 1992, Lithuanian defense planners were coptinuing their
consideration of the possible role of a civilian-based resistance capacity in their long-term
defense policy.
The government of Latvia, during the independence struggle, also took steps toward
adoption of a policy with strong similarities to civilian-based defense. In June 1991, the
Latvian 'Supreme Council (parliament) officially created

a"Center for Nonviolent Resistance;"

the main tasks of which would be (1) to create an emergency structure of instructors and
organizers of civilian-based defense for crisis situations, (2) to prepare printed instructions on
conduct during a civilian-based defense struggle, (3) to advise the population in a defense
·crisis, and (4) to publish materials on the subject.~2 Following recognition of Latvian

21 Parliamentary Information Bureau, Vilnius, Lithuania, translated by the Lithuanian
Information Center, Brooklyn, New York. Release No. 145, 28 February 1991.
22 Letter from Olgerts Eglitis, 7 October 1991.
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independence, a debate ensued about the proper role of civilian-based defense in Latvian
'
defense planning. The Supreme Council failed to fund the Center at that.point. However, the
Center officially still remained in existence and active interest among government officials
continued.
In Estonia, in January 1991, the discussion of means of defense against a concerted
Soviet attaclc included attention.to the Norwegian anti-Nazi resistance during the German
occupation, That same month, certain government and Popular Front people devised a
resistance plan for the population called."Civilian Disobedience" which was disseminated to
the general public on 12 January 1991.
In case of Soviet military action or a coup to oust the independence-minded elected
•

f

government, the Estonian people were offered basic points to follow in their resistance: to treat
all commands contradicting Estonian law as illegitimate; to carry.out strict disobedience to and
noncooperation with all Soviet attempts to strengthen control; to refuse to supply vital
information to Soviet authorities and when appropriate to. remove street names, traffic signs,
house numbers, etc.-; not to be provoked into imprudent action; to document through writing
and film Soviet activities and use all possible channels to preserve and internationally distribute
such do~umentation; to preserve the functioning of Estonia's political and social organizations
(e.g., by creating backup organizations and hiding essential equipment); to implement mass
action when appropriate; and to undertake creative communication with potentially hostile
forces. 23
In Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, high government officials have confirmed that t~ese
defense recommendations during the crises of 1991 were ba~ed primarily on writings about
civilian-based defense, supplemented by other ideas.

23 Unpublished communication from Steven Huxley, 21 February 1991, prepared on the basis
of interviews with Estonian researchers, government policy advisers, Popular Front officials,
and Home Defense members.
·
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In recent years, civilian-based defense has moved into the realm of practical politics
and the "thinkable" in the field of national security policies. This has occurred on the levels of
research and policy evaluation. For the most part, the question is no longer whether this
policy has any relevance for the defense policies of diverse European governments and
societies. Rather, the question has become to what extent should this type of resistance be
incorporated into existing national policies. For the countries of the Baltics, East Central
Europe, and the former Soviet empire civilian-based defense appears to be both timely and
profoundly relevant. Civilian-based defense offers a realistic alternative to the creation and
expansion of military forces and weaponry in this conflict-filled part of the world. The
'

examples of the violence between Azeris and Armenians over Nagorno-Karabakh, and the war
between Croatia and Serbian-dominated Yugoslavia in late 1991 need not be imitated.
/

Nonviolent struggle is not only relevant to the multitude of inter-ethnic conflicts in many of
these countries, but it may be required as a way to oppose dictatorial trends within newly
independent states, so as to avoid such violence as occurred in independent Georgia in late
1991 and early 1992. By substituting nonviolent means of struggle, realistic conflicts could be
recognized and pursued, while avoiding the perils of internecine war.
Citation of the potential merits of civilian-based defense does not imply that this policy
is an easy alternative to military means or lacks its own problems and difficulties. Indeed,
civilian-based defense ought to be subjected to an examination at least as rig(?rous as that
devoted to any proposal for a major change in defense policy. Concrete examination has to be
given to the many practical problems involved in waging civilian-based defense, to possible
strategies, to types of anticipated repression, to the question of casualties, and, finally, to the
conditions for success and the chances of achieving it.

Present relevance

Civilian-based defense can provide partial or full defense policies for ;;ill of the
countries of the Baltics, East Central Europe, and the former Soviet Union. These countries
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are now faced with a reevaluation of their defense needs and policies. In this situation, they,
should assess carefully the dangers and disadvantages of maintaining large military
establishments or of joining regional military alliances .. Civilian-based defense is an
alternative that may help overcome those disadvantages. while stil,l providing an effective
means of deterrence and defense.
Without a strong defense policy, the newly independent countries of these regions may
again become engulfed by a powerful neighbor or become prey to an internal political or
mnitary dictatorship. At the same time, most of these nations are in no position to mount a
strong self-reliant defense policy by military means. Indeed, compared to potential ~ttackers,
it is hard to imagine that some newly independent countries--such as Lithuania, Latvia, and
Estonia..:-could ever develop sufficient military capacity to deter or defeat major aggressors.
Even the attempt to do so could.produce grave economic deprivation to the population,
creating ·conditions conducive to internal take-overs. In other cases, such as Ukraine, the
newly indep~ndent country might have sufficient economic resources to muster a powerful
military capacity. In fact, Ukrainian officials have announced their intention to establish a
large nation~ army and navy. However, one cannot overlook the danger of a proliferation of
large national military forces in regions of great economic, social, ethnic, and political
instability.
In light of the centuries of Russian domination and a long history of various national

and ethnic conflicts, it is almost inevitable that the development of major military forces by
these states--even when intended for purely defensive purposes--may well be misperceived as a
\ potential threat to neighboring countri~s (even if both neighbors are, for example, members 'of
the Commonwealth of Independent States). Civilian-based defense is a policy,. which, when
I

fully _adopted, can prov~de a very strong defense capacity without the likelihood of
misinterpi:etation or misrepresentation. A country with a civilian-based defense policy is not
equipped for military aggression or revanchist expansion. This important distinction couldinake a major contribution toward future good will and cooperation among these countries.
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Benefits of a civili~n-based defense policy
A country with a civilian~based defense policy, or even a civilian-based
resistance
,
.

component; is likely to benefit by the international sharing of research, experience, policy
studies, and model~ of preparation and training. Such a country through this policy would
make various gains. It may be useful to summarize some of these which have been pointed
out in this booklet.
A country developing· a civilian-based defensive capacity with such assistance would
not become dependent in its defense on a foreign government, which might have its own,
perhaps incompatible, objectives in future conflicts. Instead, the civilian-based defense
capacities would help to increase or restore self-reliance in defense, especially to smaller and
medium-sized countries.

A decisfon to prepare fot nonviolent struggle for defense would have minimal
economic costs, as compared to military option~. Additionally, nonviolent struggle would
provide ways to pursue existing conflicts within and between these countries without
stimulating a movement toward war or replicating tragic situations as in Northern Ireland,
Lebanon, and Yugoslavia. These advantages of nonviolent options are all importan_t potential
benefits of a civilian-based defense policy for all countries.
.

'

The potential of those civilian-based options has wide implications not only for defense
and the maintenance of national independence, but also for the vitality of a functioning
democracy. By placing a major responsibility for defense on the people themselves, this
policy would encourage citizens to recognize qualities of the society worthy of defense, and to
·consider how any less meritorious aspects could be improved.
In cases of invasion, civilian-based defense would also set in motion restraining
influences_ in the invaders' own country, such as the widening of splits in th_e regime and, in
extreme cases, even the formation of anti-aggression resistance. International support for
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countries.using civilian--b~sed defense against aggression may cause further problems· for.the
attackers.
Countries that adopt civilian-based resistance components or full civilian-based defense,·
as well as other sympathetic governments, could plan to assist attacked countries. This could
be arranged through a Civilian-Based Defense Mutual Assistance Treaty. The provisions of
such a treaty-based pact could include commitments and preparations for assistance to attacked
members from the other members of the organization.
The types of assistance could include any or all of the following: sharing of research
and policy analysis on the· problems and potential of such components and full policies and the
nature of potential security threats; provision of food and other essential supplies during
defense struggles; provision of radio, television, and printing facilities; diplomatic assistance
(including through the United Nations) in mobilizing international pressures against the·
attackers; when appropriate, facilitating international economic sanctions against the attackers;
providing medical supplies and services; assisting-communication (in case of an invas.ion) with
the attackers' home population, informing them of the nature of the attack and the defense
struggle, encouraging anti-attack resistance at home; providing, when needed, modest financial
support to the attacked government and society; in the case of key individuals or population
.

.

groups facing genocide, organizing or assisting escape to another country; providing safe
storage for the country's gold resources during the crisis; and serving as communication
centers to the world about the events inside the attacked country.
Countries adopting well-prepared and strong.civilian-based defense could maintain their
political and security policy independence without the need to join a military alliance.
Tensions with neighboring countries would not be aggravated by military arms races. The
choice to forgo

amilitary attack capacity could have a reassuring effect on anxio~s

neighboring countries.
Because.civilian-based resistance components and full ,civilian-based defense policies
add to actual deterrence and defense capacities, any country, no matter how small or large, cap
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adopt the policy by its own decision, without waiting for neighboring countries to do likewise.
Although phased adoption through treaty arrangements of neighboring countries is a possible
model, this is not necessary. Indeed, the initial introduction of these components or this policy
can be done just as a state would add new military weapons, withol!t waiting for its neighbors
to do the same. The example of adding civilian-based components then might be followed by
other countries, contributing both to their own increased defense capacity and to the reduction
of international tensions in the region.
The adoption of civilian-based resistance components and transarmament to full
civilian-based defense by the countries of the Baltics, East Central Europe, and the
Commonwealth of Independent States could not-only help to save these countries from foreign
domination. It would also contribute to a more decentralized, less elitist, demilitarized
Europe. This ·would be a Europe more capable not only of deterring and defending against
foreign attacks, but. also of maintaining its internal democracy. The adoption of civilian-based
defense could c~ntribute to the· decentralization of economic and political power, a,nd the
preservation of traditional and chosen cultures, ways of life, and languages of clll members of
the European family.
With fundamental changes going on in these countries, most people would agree that
this is not a time for complacency. Serious security questions will continue to face them.
They cannot ignore potential dangers. They have an opportunity to consider the possible
advantages offered by a new policy of realism.
Civilian-based defense provides an alternative:
I to helplessness in the face of danger and aggression,
B to war, regardless of in whose mime it is waged,
ifl to submission of the militarily weaker nations to the more powerful ones, and

Iii to economic disaster produced by efforts to obtain costly military weaponry.

Instead, this policy can potentialiy provide a powerful means of deterrence and defense against
would-be attackers, with very limited economic cost.
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The exploration of the policy potential of civilian-based resistance components and of
full civilian-based defense is one of the most important defense tasks that a society, its
institutions, and its govef!)ment could undertake in these times of transition.
With the dramatic events of 1989 and 1990, and the continuing political movements in
the former Soviet dominated territories, a need exists for fresh thinking about defense. A
major opportunity for such thinking now exists and it may be to the benefit of all concerned to
use it constructively and responsibly.
An alternative new policy of defense can now be provided through a refinement of
people power, producing a more effective, sophisticated, and powerful defense policy. It is a
defense policy based on people, not bombs, on human institutions, not military technology,
serving freedom, not threatening annihilation. Civilian-based defense is a creative defense
· based on the power of people even in grave crises to become, and remain, the masters of their
own destinies.·

